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{{Infoboks militær konflikt
|konflikt = Operation Bagration
|delaf = 2. Verdenskrig
|billede = [[Fil:1944 july 17 moscow german pow.jpg|300px]]
|titel = Tyske krigsfanger fra 4. armé marcheres gennem Moskvas gader
|dato = [[22. juni]] - [[19. august]] [[1944]]
|sted = Hviderusland, Polen
|casus =
|territorium =
|resultat = Afgørende sovjetisk sejr
|status =
|part1 = {{Land|flagland|Nazityskland}}<br/>{{Land|flagland|Rumænien}}<br/>{{flagikon|Ungarn|1940}} [[Ungarn]]
|fører1 = {{flagikon|Nazityskland}} [[Ernst Busch]] (til 28. juni)<br>{{flagikon|Nazityskland}} [[Walter Model]] ([[Heeresgruppe Mitte]])<br>{{flagikon|Nazityskland}} [[Hans Jordan]] (9. armé)<br>{{flagikon|Nazityskland}} [[Georg-Hans Reinhardt]] (3. panserarmé)<br>{{flagikon|Nazityskland}} [[Kurt von Tippelskirch]] (4. armé)<br>{{flagikon|Nazityskland}} [[Walter Weiss]] (2. armé)
|styrke1 = 800.000 mand<br>1.555 fly
|tab1 = 290.000 døde og savnede<br>120.000 sårede<br>150.000 fangne<ref>Bergstrom</ref>
|part2 = {{Land|flagland|Sovjetunionen}}
|fører2 = {{flagikon|Sovjetunionen|1923}} [[Aleksandr Vasilevsky]]<br>{{flagikon|Sovjetunionen|1923}} [[Georgy Zjukov]]<br>{{flagikon|Sovjetunionen|1923}} [[Hovhannes Bagramyan]] (1. baltiske front)<br>{{flagikon|Sovjetunionen|1923}} [[Ivan Chernyakhovsky]] (3. hviderussiske front)<br>{{flagikon|Sovjetunionen|1923}} [[Konstantin Rokossovskij]] (1. hviderussiske front)<br>{{flagikon|Sovjetunionen|1923}} [[Georgij Zakharov]] (2. hviderussiske front)
|styrke2 = 1.254.300 mand<br>4.070 kampvogne<br>24.363 kanoner<br>5.327 fly<ref>Glantz & House 1995, p. 201.</ref>
|tab2 = 178.507 døde og savnede<br>590.848 sårede og syge<ref>Россия и СССР в войнах ХХ века - Потери вооружённых сил, Moskow, Olma-Press, tilgængelig on-line http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter5_10_1.html#5_10_36</ref>.
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{{Østfronten}}
'''Operation ''Bagration''''' (russisk: Oперация Багратион, Operatsiya ''Bagration'') var kodenavnet for den sovjetiske offensiv i 1944 i Hviderusland under [[2. Verdenskrig]], som tvang de tyske styrker ud af [[Hviderusland]] og det østlige [[Polen]]. Operationen foregik mellem [[22. juni]] og [[19. august]] [[1944]].
Operationen blev opkaldt efter den russiske general fyrst [[Pyotr Bagration]], som var general i den russiske hær under [[Napoleonskrigene]] og blev dødeligt såret i [[slaget ved Borodino]].
The Soviet armies directly involved in Operation ''Bagration'' were the [[1st Baltic Front]] under Army General [[Hovhannes Bagramyan]], the [[1st Belorussian Front]] commanded by Army General [[Konstantin Rokossovsky]], who was promoted to Marshal on June 29, 1944, the [[2nd Belorussian Front]] commanded by Colonel-General G. F. Zakharov, and the [[3rd Belorussian Front]] commanded by Colonel-General [[Ivan Chernyakhovsky]].
This action resulted in the almost complete destruction of the German [[Army Group Centre]] and three of its component armies: [[German Fourth Army|Fourth Army]], [[Third Panzer Army]] and [[German Ninth Army|Ninth Army]]. The operation "was the most calamitous defeat of all the German armed forces in World War II".<ref>Zaloga, ''Bagration 1944: The Destruction of Army Group Centre'', 7.</ref> By the end of the operation most of the western Soviet Union had been liberated and the Red Army had achieved footholds in Romania and Poland.
The objectives of the operation are more complicated. The Red Army practiced the concept of [[Deep operations|Soviet Deep Operations, Soviet Deep Battle]] and Maskirovka, (military deception). It has been suggested the primary target of the Soviet offensive was bridgehead on the [[Vistula]] river in central Poland, and that Operation Bagration was to create a crisis in Belorussia to divert German mobile reserves to the central sectors as a part of Maskirovka, removing them from the [[Lublin]]-[[Brest, Belarus|Brest]], [[Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive|Lvov-Sandomierz area]] area where the Soviets intended to undertake the [[Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive]]<ref>Watt 2008, p. 699.</ref> and [[Lublin-Brest Offensive]].<ref>Watt 2008, p. 669.</ref> This allowed the Red Army to reach the Vistula river and Warsaw, which in turn put Soviet forces within striking distance of [[Berlin]], conforming to the concept of Soviet deep operations - striking deep into the enemy's [[strategic depth]]s.<ref>Watt 2008, p. 670.</ref>
==Background==
[[Army Group Centre]] had previously proved tough to defeat as the Soviet defeat in [[Operation Mars|Operation ''Mars'']] had shown. But by June 1944, despite shortening its front line, it had been exposed following the severe defeats of [[Army Group South]] in the battles that followed the [[Battle of Kursk]], the [[Battle of Kiev (1943)|Liberation of Kiev]] and the [[Crimean Offensive (1944)|Liberation of the Crimea]] in the late summer, autumn and winter of 1943–44—the soviet-called [[Great Patriotic War|third period of the Great Patriotic War]]. [[Battle of Smolensk (1943)|Operation ''Suvorov'']] had seen Army Group Centre itself forced to retreat westwards from [[Smolensk]] during the autumn of 1943.
By the middle of June 1944 the [[Western Allies]] on the [[Cotentin Peninsula]] were just over 1046 [[kilometre|km]] (650 [[mile]]s) from Berlin, while the Soviet forces at the [[Vitebsk Gate]] were within 1200 km (745 miles) of the German capital. For the [[Third Reich]] the strategic threats were about the same.<ref name=Ziemke_p11>Ziemke, p.11</ref> Hitler underestimated the threat posed by Soviet troops facing Army Group Centre and had redeployed one third of Army Group Centre's [[artillery]], half their [[tank destroyer]]s and 88 percent of their tanks to the Southern front where the German high command expected the next major Soviet offensive.<ref name=Ziemke_p11/>
''Bagration'', in combination with the neighbouring [[Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive|''Lvov-Sandomierz'' Offensive]] launched a few weeks later in [[Ukraine]], allowed the Soviet Union to recapture Belorussia and the Ukraine within its 1941 borders, advance into German [[East Prussia]], but more importantly, the Lvov-Sandomierz operation allowed the Red Army to reach the outskirts of [[Warsaw]] after gaining control of Poland east of the [[Vistula]] river. The operation enabled the next operation, [[Vistula–Oder Offensive]], to come within sight of the German capital.<ref>Watt 2008, pp. 699-700.</ref>. The Soviets were initially surprised at their success of the Belorussian operation which had nearly reached Warsaw. The Soviet advance encouraged the [[Warsaw uprising]] against the German occupation forces. This enabled Joseph Stalin to destroy, indirectly, his enemies in Poland by allowing the Germans to crush the uprising.{{Citation needed|date=July 2009}} Stalin was irritated by the military success in the central sector as it forced him to reveal more of his post war intent earlier than he would have liked.{{Citation needed|date=July 2009}}
The battle has been described as the triumph of the Soviet theory of "the [[operational art]]" because of the complete co-ordination of all the Strategic Front movements and signals traffic to fool the enemy about the target of the offensive. The military tactical operations of the Red Army successfully avoided the mobile reserves of the ''Wehrmacht'' and continually "wrong-footed" the German forces. Despite the huge forces involved, Soviet [[Front (Soviet Army)|front]] commanders left their adversaries completely confused about the main axis of attack until it was too late.<ref>Watt 2008, pp. 673-674.</ref>
==Prelude to the battle==
===The ''Maskirovka'' campaign===
====Soviet deception====
The Russian word ''[[maskirovka]]'' literally means 'camouflaging' in English, but has broader application in military use, and during WWII was used by Soviet commanders to describe a broad range of measures to create [[military deception|deception]] with the goal of inflicting surprise on the Wehrmacht forces.<ref>Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, xxxvii-xxxviii</ref>
The ''[[Oberkommando des Heeres]]'' expected the Soviets to launch a major [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] offensive in the summer of [[1944]].
''[[Stavka]]'' considered a number of options. The overall timetable of operations between June and August had been decided on by 28 April 1944. The ''Stavka'' rejected an offensive in either the L'vov sector or the Yassy/Kishinev sectors owing to the presence of powerful enemy mobile forces equal in strength to the Soviet strategic fronts. Instead they suggested four options, an offensive into Romania and through the [[Carpathian Mountains|Carpathians]], a huge offensive into the western [[Ukrainian SSR]] aimed at the [[Baltic sea|Baltic coast]], an attack into the Baltic and [[Belorussian SSR]]. The first two options were rejected as being too ambitious and open to flank attack. The Third option was rejected on the grounds the enemy was too well prepared. The only safe option was an offensive into Belorussia which would enable subsequent offensives from the Ukraine into Poland and Romania.<ref>Watt 2008, p. 683</ref>
Both the Soviet and German High Commands recognised the western Ukraine as a staging area for an offensive into Poland. The Soviets, aware that the enemy would be aware of this, engaged in a complex maskirovka campaign to catch the German armoured forces off guard by creating a crisis in Belorussia that would force the Germans to move their powerful Panzer forces, fresh from their victory in the [[First Jassy-Kishinev Offensive]] in April-June 1944, to the central front to support Army Group Centre. This was the primary purpose of Bagration.<ref>Watt 2008, p. 685.</ref>
In order to maximize the chances of success, the maskirovka was a double bluff. The Soviets left four tank armies in the L'vov-Peremyshl area, and allowed the Germans to be fully aware of their presence. The attack into Romanian in April- June 1944 further convinced the Soviets that the Axis forces in Romania needed removing and kept the Germans concerned about their defences there and in southern Poland, while drawing German forces to the L'vov sector.<ref>Watt 2008, pp. 683-684.</ref> Once the offensive against Army Group Centre had been initiated, lacking mobile reserves and support, it would create a crisis in the central sector that would force the German armoured forces north to Belorussia from Poland and Romania, despite the presence of powerful Soviet concentrations threatening German-occupied Poland.<ref>Watt 2008, p. 684.</ref>
The intent of the Soviets to strike their main blow towards the Vistula can be seen in the Red Army's (albeit fragmented) order of battle. The Soviet General Staff Studies of both the Belorussian and L'vov-Sandomierz operations reveal that the L'vov-[[Przemyśl]] operation received the overwhelming number of Tank and Mechanized Corps. Six Guards Tank Corps and six standard Tank Corps along with three Guards Mechanized and two standard Mechanized Corps were committed to the L'vov operation. This totaled twelve Tank and five Mechanized Corps. In contrast, Operation Bagration's Baltic and Belorussian Fronts were allocated just eight Tank and two Mechanized Corps.<ref>Watt 2008, p. 686.</ref> Furthermore the 1st Belorussian Front, which formed a key part of the L'vov-Peremshyl operation, is not mentioned on the Soviet battle order for the offensive. It contained a further six armies and was to protect the flank of the [[Lublin–Brest Offensive]] as well as engage in active offensive operations in that area.<ref>Watt 2008, p. 687.</ref>
The allocation of of tactical resources, in particular [[Anti-tank warfare|anti-tank artillery]], was allocated to the [[1st Ukrainian Front]], the spearhead of the Vistula, L'vov-Premyshl operation. Thirty-eight of the fifty-four anti-tank regiments allocated to the Belorussian-Baltic-Ukrainian operations were given to the 1st Ukrainian Front.<ref name="Watt 2008, p. 690">Watt 2008, p. 690.</ref> This demonstrates that the Soviet plans for the L'vov operation were a major consideration, and whoever planned the offensive was determined to hold the recently captured territory.<ref name="Watt 2008, p. 690"/> The target for this operation was the Vistula Bridgehead, and the enormous anti-tank artillery forces helped repulse a series of heavy, concentrated, counter attacks by German armour in August-October 1944.<ref name="Watt 2008, p. 691">Watt 2008, p. 691.</ref>
Most of the aviation units, both [[fighter aircraft]] and assault aviation ([[strike aircraft]]) were given to the L'vov operation and the protection of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Of the seventy-eight Fighter and assault aviation Divisions committed to Bagration, thirty-two were allocated to the L'vov operation, nearly fifty percent of the aviation groups committed to Bagration<ref>Watt 2008, p. 692.</ref> and contained more than was committed to the Belorussian operation.<ref name="Watt 2008, p. 691"/> This concentration of aviation was to protect the Vistula bridgeheads against air attack and to assualt German counter offensives from the air.<ref>Watt 2008, pp. 691-693.</ref>
====German reactions====
Towards the beginning of June, the German High Command, Army Group Center and the Army Commands had identified a large part of the concentration against Army Group Centre, although it was still considered that the main operation would be against Army Group North Ukraine. On 14 June, the Chief of Staff of Army Group Centre said to General [[Kurt Zeitzler]] that "...the Russian concentration here [in front of 9th Army] and at the Autobahn clearly indicates that the enemy attack will be aimed at the wings of the Army Group". On 10 June the OKH took over the opinion of Army Group Centre in its estimate of the enemy situation: "When it is still to be considered that the attack against Army Group Centre will be a secondary operation in the framework of the global Soviet offensive operations, it must be taken into account that the enemy will also be capable in front of Army Group center to build concentrations of which the force of penetration cannot be underestimated in view of the ratio of forces between the two sides".<ref>Niepold,Mittlere Ostfront Juni 1944,pp 22-23 </ref>
On 19 June it was noted in the estimate of the enemy situation by Army Group Centre that the concentration of enemy air forces had become greater (4500 out of 11000) and that this left new doubts regarding OKH's general estimate. The OKH, however, thought there was no ground for this supposition.<ref>Niepold,Mittlere Ostfront Juni 1944 p28 </ref>
Shortly before the beginning of the Soviet offensive, the individual army commands had detected some enemy forces near the front and identified the places where the main attacks would be carried out, with the exception of 6th Guards Army near Vitebsk. The Soviet strategic reserves were also not detected.<ref>Niepold, Mittlere Ostfront Juni 1944 pp 31-32 </ref>
===Operations ''Rail War'' and ''Concert''===
The first phase of Operation ''Bagration'' involved the many [[Soviet partisan|partisan]] formations in the [[Belorussian SSR]], which were instructed to restart their campaigns of targeting railways and communications behind German lines. From [[19 June]], large numbers of explosive charges were placed on rail tracks, and though many were cleared, they had a significant disruptive effect. The partisans would also be used to mop up encircled German forces once the breakthrough and exploitation phases of the operation were completed.
[[Image:BagrationMap2.jpg|300px|thumb|Deployments during Operation ''Bagration''. The encirclements of Fourth Army east of Minsk and Ninth Army near Bobruisk are clearly shown, as is the encirclement of the LIII Corps of Third Panzer Army in Vitebsk.]]
At the commencement of the offensive, ''Stavka'' had committed approximately 1,700,000 combat and support troops, approximately 24,000 artillery pieces and mortars, 4,080 tanks and assault guns and 6,334 aircraft. German strength at the outset was approximately 800,000 combat and support troops, 9,500 artillery pieces, but only 553 tanks and assault guns and 839 aircraft. In particular, Army Group Centre was seriously short of mobile reserves: the demotorized [[German 14th Infantry Division|14th Infantry Division]] was the only substantial reserve formation available, though the [[20th Panzer Division]] was positioned in the south near [[Bobruisk]] and the understrength ''[[Panzer Corps Feldherrnhalle (Germany)|Panzergrenadier-Division Feldherrnhalle]]'' was also held in reserve. The relatively static lines in Belorussia had, however, enabled the Germans to construct extensive field fortifications, with multiple trench lines to a depth of several [[kilometre]]s and heavily mined defensive belts.
==Order of Battle==
===Wehrmacht===
*[[Army Group Centre]] ([[Field-Marshal]] [[Ernst Busch (military)|Ernst Busch]] to [[June 28]]; then Field Marshal [[Walter Model]])
**[[Third Panzer Army]] ([[Colonel-General]] [[Georg-Hans Reinhardt]])
***[[IX Corps (Germany)|IX Corps]] (General [[Rolf Wuthmann]])
***[[LIII Corps (Germany)|LIII Corps]] (General [[Friedrich Gollwitzer]])
***[[VI Corps (Germany)|VI Corps]] (General [[Georg Pfeiffer]] to [[June 28]])
***Reserve: [[German 14th Infantry Division|14th Infantry Division]]
**[[Fourth Army (Germany)|Fourth Army]] (General [[Kurt von Tippelskirch]])
***[[XXVII Corps (Germany)|XXVII Corps]] (General [[Paul Völckers]])
***[[XXXIX Panzer Corps (Germany)|XXXIX Panzer Corps]] (General [[Robert Martinek]] to [[June 28]]; then Lieutenant-General [[Otto Schünemann]] to [[June 29]])
***[[XII Corps (Germany)|XII Corps]] (General [[Vincenz Müller]])
***Reserve: ''[[Panzer Corps Feldherrnhalle (Germany)|Panzergrenadier-Division Feldherrnhalle]]'', [[German 286th Security Division|286th Security Division]]
**[[Ninth Army (Germany)|Ninth Army]] (General [[Hans Jordan]] to [[June 27]]; then General [[Nikolaus von Vormann]])
***[[XXXV Corps (Germany)|XXXV Corps]] (Lieutenant-General [[Kurt-Jürgen Freiherr von Lützow]])
***[[XXXXI Panzer Corps (Germany)|XXXXI Panzer Corps]] (Lieutenant-General [[Edmund Hoffmeister]])
***[[LV Corps (Germany)|LV Corps]] (General [[Friedrich Herrlein]])
***Reserve: [[20th Panzer Division]], [[707th Infantry Division(Germany)|707th Infantry Division]]
**[[Second Army (Germany)|Second Army]] (Colonel-General [[Walter Weiss]])
Second Army was not involved in the first or second phases of the German defense, being positioned south of the main axis of Soviet operations.
===Red Army===
Two special representatives to ''[[Stavka]]'' were appointed to coordinate the operations of the Fronts involved: [[Alexander Vasilevsky]] and [[Georgy Zhukov]].
*[[1st Baltic Front]] (General [[Hovhannes Bagramyan]])
**[[4th Shock Army (Soviet Union)|4th Shock Army]]
**[[6th Guards Army (Soviet Union)|6th Guards Army]]
**[[43rd Army (Soviet Union)|43rd Army]]
**[[3rd Air Army (Soviet Union)|3rd Air Army]]
*[[3rd Belorussian Front]] (General [[Ivan Chernyakhovsky]])
**[[11th Guards Army]] (General [[Kuzma Galitsky]])
**[[5th Army (Soviet Union)|5th Army]]
**[[39th Army (Soviet Union)|39th Army]] (General [[Ivan Lyudnikov]])
**[[31st Army (Soviet Union)|31st Army]] (General [[Vasily Glagolev]])
**[[5th Guards Tank Army]] (General [[Pavel Rotmistrov]])
**[[1st Air Army (Soviet Union)|1st Air Army]]
**Cavalry-mechanised group under command of Lieutenant-General [[Nikolai Oslikovksy]], including [[3rd Guards Cavalry Corps (Soviet Union)|3rd Guards Cavalry Corps]]
*[[2nd Belorussian Front]] (Colonel-General [[Gyorgy Zakharov]])
**[[33rd Army (Soviet Union)|33rd Army]] (Lieutenant-General [[Vasily Kryuchenkin]])
**[[49th Army (Soviet Union)|49th Army]] (Lieutenant-General [[Ivan Grishin]])
**[[50th Аrmy (Soviet Union)|50th Army]] (Lieutenant-General [[Ivan Boldin]])
**[[4th Air Аrmy (Soviet Union)|4th Air Army]]
*[[1st Belorussian Front]] (General [[Konstantin Rokossovsky]])
**[[3rd Army (Soviet Union)|3rd Army]] (General [[Alexander Gorbatov]])
**[[28th Army (Soviet Union)|28th Army]]
**[[48th Аrmy (Soviet Union)|48th Army]]
**[[65th Army (Soviet Union)|65th Army]] (General [[Pavel Batov]])
**[[16th Air Аrmy (Soviet Union)|16th Air Army]]
**Cavalry-mechanised group under command of Lieutenant-General Pliev, including 1st Mechanised Corps, 4th Guards Cavalry Corps
*[[1st Ukrainian Front]] ([[Ivan Konev|Marshal Ivan S. Konev]])
**[[3rd Guards Army]]
**[[13th Army (Soviet Union)|13th Army]]
**[[60th Army (Soviet Union)|60th Army]]
**[[38th Army (Soviet Union)|38th Army]]
**[[1st Guards Army]]
**[[18th Army (Soviet Union)|18th Army]]
**[[1st Guards Tank Army]]
**[[3rd Guards Tank Army]]
**[[4th Tank Army]]
**[[5th Guards Army]]
**Cavalry-mechanised Group 1 and 2
The 1st Belorussian Front was particularly large, and included further units which were only committed during the following [[Lublin-Brest Offensive]].
==The battle - first phase: the tactical breakthrough==
Operation ''Bagration'' began on [[22 June]] [[1944]], the same calendar day on which the Germans had previously invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, with probing attacks throughout the German lines. The main offensive began in the early morning of [[23 June]], with an artillery bombardment of unprecedented scale against the defensive works. Within hours, some sectors of the German defenses were in danger of being breached.
The first phase of Soviet deep operations, the "deep battle" envisaged breaking through the tactical zones and forward German defences. Once these tactical offensives had been successful, fresh operational reserves exploited the breakthrough and the operational depths of the enemy front using powerful mechanized and armoured formations to encircle enemy concentrations on an Army Group Scale.
===Vitebsk-Orsha Offensive===
{{Main|Vitebsk–Orsha Offensive}}
The operation was conducted by the [[1st Baltic Front]] and [[3rd Belorussian Front]] against the positions of Army Group Centre's northern army, [[Third Panzer Army]], and the northern flank of [[Fourth Army (Germany)|Fourth Army]].
In the north, the 1st Baltic Front pushed the [[IX Corps (Germany)|IX corps]] over the Dvina, while encircling the [[LIII Corps (Germany)|LIII Corps]] in the city of [[Vitebsk]] by [[June 25]]. To the south, the 3rd Belorussian Front drove through the [[VI Corps (Germany)|VI Corps]], shattering it. Vitebsk was taken by [[27 June]], the entire LIII Corps of 30,000 men being destroyed.
The 3rd Belorussian Front simultaneously opened operations against Fourth Army's [[XXVII Corps (Germany)|XXVII Corps]] holding [[Orsha]] and the main [[Moscow]] - [[Minsk]] road. Despite a tenacious German defense, Orsha was liberated by [[26 June]], and the 3rd Belorussian Front's mechanized forces were able to penetrate far into the German rear, reaching the [[Berezina]] River by [[28 June]].
===Mogilev Offensive===
{{Main|Mogilev Offensive}}
The primary aim of the Mogilev Offensive, and of the [[2nd Belorussian Front]], was to pin down the majority of [[Fourth Army (Germany)|Fourth Army]] while the developing Vitebsk-Orsha and Bobruysk Offensives encircled it. The 2nd Belorussian Front's units attacked on [[23 June]], aiming to force crossings of the [[Dnepr]] against two of Army Group Centre's strongest corps, the [[XXXIX Panzer Corps (Germany)|XXXIX Panzer Corps]] and [[XII Corps (Germany)|XII Corps]].
The Dnepr was crossed by the [[49th Army (Soviet Union)|49th Army]] by [[27 June]], and by [[28 June]] it had encircled and taken the town of [[Mogilev]]. The XXXIX Panzer Corps and XII Corps began to fall back towards the [[Berezina River]] under heavy air attack, but were retreating into a trap.
===Bobruysk Offensive===
{{Main|Bobruysk Offensive}}
The Bobruysk Offensive, against [[Ninth Army (Germany)|Ninth Army]] on the southern flank of Army Group Centre, was opened by the [[1st Belorussian Front]] on [[23 June]], but suffered heavy losses attempting to penetrate the German defenses. Rokossovsky ordered additional bombing and artillery preparation, and launched further attacks the next day.
The [[3rd Army (Soviet Union)|3rd Army]] broke through in the north of the sector, trapping the German [[XXXV Corps (Germany)|XXXV Corps]] against the [[Berezina]]. The [[65th Army (Soviet Union)|65th Army]] then broke through the [[XXXXI Panzer Corps]] to the south; by [[27 June]] the two German corps were encircled in a pocket east of [[Bobruysk]] under constant aerial bombardment.
Some elements of Ninth Army managed to break out of Bobruysk on [[28 June]], but up to 70,000 troops were killed or taken prisoner. The 1st Belorussian Front's forces liberated Bobruysk on [[29 June]] after intense street fighting.
==Second phase: Strategic offensive against Army Group Centre==
The second phase of Operation Bagration involved the entire operation's most significant single objective: the retaking of [[Minsk]], capital of the [[Belorussian SSR]]. It would also complete the large-scale encirclement and destruction, set up by the first phase, of much of Army Group Centre.
===Minsk Offensive===
{{Main|Minsk Offensive}}
From [[28 June]], the main exploitation units of the [[3rd Belorussian Front]] (the [[5th Guards Tank Army (Soviet Union)|5th Guards Tank Army]] and an attached cavalry-mechanised group) began to push on to secure crossings of the [[Berezina]], followed by the [[11th Guards Army (Soviet Union)|11th Guards Army]]. In the south, exploitation forces of the [[1st Belorussian Front]] began to close the lower pincer of the trap developing around the [[German Fourth Army]].<ref>Glantz & House 1995, pp. 206-207.</ref>
The Germans rushed the [[5th Panzer Division]] into Belorussia to cover the approaches to Minsk, while the units of Fourth Army began to withdraw over the Berezina crossings, where they were pounded by heavy air bombardment.
After forcing crossings of the Berezina, Soviet forces closed on Minsk. The [[2nd Guards Tank Corps (Soviet Union)|2nd Guards Tank Corps]] was the first to break into the city in the early hours of [[3 July]]; fighting erupted in the centre, which was finally cleared of German rearguards by the following day. The 5th Guards Tank Army and 65th Army closed the encirclement to the west of Minsk, trapping the entire German Fourth Army, and much of the remnants of Ninth Army.<ref>Glantz & House 1995, pp. 207-209.</ref>
Over the next few days, the pocket east of Minsk was reduced: only a fraction of the 100,000 troops in it escaped. Minsk had been liberated, and Army Group Centre utterly destroyed, in possibly the greatest single defeat suffered by the ''Wehrmacht'' in the whole war. In twelve days, 22 June - 4 July 1944, Army Group Centre lost 25 divisions and 300,000 men. In the few subsequent weeks the Germans lost another 100,000 men.<ref>Glantz & House 1995, p. 209.</ref>
===Polotsk Offensive===
{{Main|Polotsk Offensive}}
The Polotsk Offensive had the dual objective of taking [[Polotsk]] itself, and of screening the northern flank of the main Minsk Offensive against a possible German counter-offensive from [[Army Group North]].
The 1st Baltic Front successfully pursued the retreating remnants of Third Panzer Army back towards Polotsk, which was reached by [[1 July]]. German forces attempted to organise a defense using rear-area support units and several divisions hurriedly transferred from Army Group North.
Units of the 1st Baltic Front's 4th Shock Army and 6th Guards Army fought their way into the city over the next few days, and successfully cleared it of German forces by [[4 July]].
==Third phase: strategic offensive operations in the south==
As German resistance had almost completely collapsed, Soviet forces were ordered to push on as far as possible beyond the original objective of Minsk, and new objectives were issued by ''Stavka''. This resulted in a third phase of offensive operations, which should be regarded as a further part of Operation Bagration.
Field-Marshal [[Walter Model]], who had taken over command of Army Group Centre on [[28 June]] when [[Ernst Busch (military)|Ernst Busch]] was sacked, hoped to reestablish a defensive line running through [[Lida]] using what was left of Third Panzer, Fourth and Ninth Armies along with new reinforcements.{{note label|Note2|b|b}}
===Shyaulyay Offensive===
{{Main|Shyaulyay Offensive}}
The Shyaulyay Offensive covered the operations of the 1st Baltic Front between [[5th July]] and [[31 July]] against the remnants of Third Panzer Army; its main objective was the [[Lithuania]]n city of [[Šiauliai]] ({{lang-ru|Shyaulyai}}; {{lang-de|Schaulen}}).
The 43rd, 51st, and 2nd Guards Armies attacked towards Riga on the Baltic coast with 3rd Guards Mechanised Corps attached. By [[31 July]], the coast on the [[Gulf of Riga]] had been reached. 6th Guards Army covered [[Riga]] and the extended flank of the penetration towards the north.
A hurriedly-organised German counter-attack managed to restore the severed connection between the remnants of Army Group Centre and Army Group North. During August, the Germans attempted to retake Šiauliai in [[Operation Doppelkopf]] and [[Operation Cäsar]], but failed.
===Vilnius Offensive===
{{Main|Vilnius Offensive}}
The Vilnius Offensive was conducted by units of the 3rd Belorussian Front subsequent to their completion of the Minsk Offensive; they were opposed by the remnants of Third Panzer and Fourth Armies.
Units of Fourth Army, principally the 5th Panzer Division, attempted to hold the key rail junction of [[Molodechno]], but it was taken by units of the [[11th Guards Army (Soviet Union)|11th Guards Army]], [[5th Guards Tank Army]] and [[3rd Guards Cavalry Corps (Soviet Union)|3rd Guards Cavalry Corps]] on [[5 June]]. German forces continued a precipitate retreat, and Soviet forces reached [[Vilnius]], held by units of the Third Panzer Army, by [[7 July]].
By [[8 July]], the city had been encircled, trapping the garrison, who were ordered to hold fast at all costs. Soviet forces then fought their way into the city in intense street-by-street fighting (alongside an [[Armia Krajowa]] uprising, [[Operation Ostra Brama]]). On [[12 July]], [[6th Panzer Division (Germany)|6th Panzer Division]] counter-attacked and temporarily opened an escape corridor for the besieged troops, but the majority of them were lost when the city finally fell on [[13 July]] (this phase of the operation is commonly known as the [[Battle of Vilnius (1944)|Battle of Vilnius]]).
===Belostock Offensive===
{{Main|Belostock Offensive}}
The Belostock Offensive covered the operations of 2nd Belorussian Front between [[5 July]] and [[27 July]], with the objective of the [[Poland|Polish]] city of [[Białystok]].
The [[40th Rifle Corps (Soviet Union)|40th]] and [[41st Rifle Corps (Soviet Union)|41st Rifle Corps]] of [[3rd Army (Soviet Union)|3rd Army]], on the front's left wing, took Białystok by storm of 27 July, after two days of fighting.
===Lublin-Brest Offensive===
{{Main|Lublin-Brest Offensive}}
The Lublin-Brest Offensive was carried out by Marshal Rokossovsky's 1st Belorussian Front between [[18 July]] and [[2 August]], and developed the initial gains of Operation Bagration towards eastern [[Poland]] and the [[Vistula]]. The 47th and 8th Guards Armies reached the [[Western Bug]] River by [[21 July]], and the latter reached the eastern bank of the Vistula by [[25 July]]. [[Lublin]] was taken on the [[24 July]]; the [[2nd Tank Army (Soviet Union)|2nd Tank Army]] was ordered to turn northward, towards [[Warsaw]], to cut off the retreat of forces from Army Group Centre in the [[Brest, Belarus|Brest]] area. Brest was taken on [[28 July]] and the Front's left wing seized bridgeheads over the Vistula by [[2 August]]. This effectively completed the operation, the remainder of the summer being given over to defensive efforts against a series of German counter-attacks on the bridgeheads.
The Operation ended with the defeat German Army Group North Ukraine and Soviet bridgeheads over the Vistula river west of Sandomierz.<ref>Glantz 2002, p. 1.</ref>
===Kaunas Offensive===
{{Main|Kaunas Offensive}}
The Kaunas Offensive covered the operations of Chernyakhovsky's [[3rd Belorussian Front]] from [[28 July]] to [[28 August]], towards the [[Lithuania]]n city of [[Kaunas]], subsequent to their completion of the offensive against Vilnius.
===Osovets Offensive===
{{Main|Osovets Offensive}}
This offensive covered the operations of [[2nd Belorussian Front]] from [[6 August]] to [[14 August]], after their completion of the Belostock Offensive, with the objective of the fortified area at [[Osowiec]] on one of the tributaries of the [[Narew]] River. The very large fortress complex there secured the approaches to [[East Prussia]] through the region's marshes.
German forces were able to stabilise their line of defense along the Narew, which they held until the [[East Prussian Offensive]] of January [[1945]].
==Aftermath==
Compared to other battles, this was by far the greatest Soviet victory in numerical terms. The Red Army inflicted nearly four times as many losses on the Germans as they sustained, and liberated a vast amount of Soviet territory (whose population had suffered greatly under the [[Occupation of Belarus by Nazi Germany|German occupation]]) the advancing Soviets found cities destroyed, villages depopulated, and much of the population killed, or deported by the occupiers. In order to show the outside world the magnitude of the victory, some 50,000 German prisoners, taken from the encirclement east of Minsk, were paraded through Moscow: even marching quickly and twenty abreast, they took three hours to pass.<ref name=Merridale_p241>Merridale, p.241</ref> In a symbolic gesture the streets were washed down afterwards.
The German army never recovered from the [[materiel]] and [[manpower]] losses sustained during this time, having lost about a quarter of its Eastern Front manpower, similar to the percentage [[Battle of Stalingrad|lost at Stalingrad]] (about 20 full divisions). These losses included many experienced troops, [[Unteroffizier|NCO]]s and other officers, which at this stage of the war the ''[[Wehrmacht]]'' could not replace. The operation was also notable for the number of German generals lost: 9 were killed, including 2 corps commanders; 22 captured, including 4 corps commanders; Major-General Hahn, commander of 197th Infantry Division disappeared on [[24 June]], while Lieutenant-Generals Zutavern and Philipp of the [[18th Panzergrenadier Division|18th Panzergrenadier]] and [[134th Infantry Division (Germany)|134th Infantry]] Divisions committed suicide.
Overall, the near-total annihilation of Army Group Centre cost the Germans 2,000 tanks and 57,000 other vehicles. According to [[Steven Zaloga]], German losses are estimated at 300,000 dead, 250,000 wounded, and about 120,000 captured (overall casualties at 670,000); Soviet losses were also substantial, with 60,000 killed, 110,000 wounded, and about 8,000 missing, with 2,957 tanks, 2,447 artillery pieces, and 822 aircraft also lost.<ref name=Zaloga71>Zaloga, p.71</ref>
The offensive cut off [[Army Group North]] and [[Army Group North Ukraine]] from each other, and weakened them as resources were diverted to the central sector. This forced both Army Groups to withdraw from Soviet territory much more quickly when faced with the following Soviet offensives in their sectors.
The final destruction of much of Army Group Centre around Minsk coincided with the destruction of many of the German army's strongest units in France in the [[Falaise pocket]], although the scale was much smaller than Bagration in numerical terms and especially in terms of damage to Wermacht in both personnel and materiel. On both eastern and western fronts, the subsequent Allied exploitation was slowed and halted by supply problems rather than German resistance. However, the Germans were able to transfer armoured units from the Italian front, where they could afford to give ground, to resist the Soviet advance near [[Warsaw]].
==References==
=== Notes===
*{{note label|Note1|a|a}} Figures for total German losses along the Eastern Front from 1 June–29 August 1944 were 71,685 killed, 503,564 and 325,381, for a total 900,630.<ref>Bergstrom 2008, p.82.</ref>
*{{note label|Note2|b|b}} The German Order of Battle for Army Group Centre in mid-July shows the remnants of Ninth Army incorporated in Second Army; Third Panzer Army reduced to ''Korps-Abteilung G'' and fragments of IX and XXVI Corps; and Fourth Army consisting of the battered 5th Panzer and 50th Infantry Divisions along with ''Kampfgruppe Flörke'', some remnants of security divisions and part of the ''[[3rd SS Division Totenkopf|Totenkopf]]'' (all under the command of [[Helmuth Weidling]], who had previously been commanding a corps of Ninth Army at Bobruisk) plus [[7th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|7th Panzer]] (see Hinze, ''Ostfrontdrama 1944''). Though Soviet forces were exhausted and their supply lines dangerously extended, the extremely weak forces arrayed against them encouraged commanders to push on as far as possible.
===Citations===
{{Reflist}}
===Bibliography===
* Adair, Paul. (1994). ''Hitler's Greatest Defeat: The collapse of Army Group Centre, June 1944''. Weidenfeld Military. ISBN 1854092324
* Beevor, Antony and Vinogradova, Luba (eds.). ''A Writer at War: Vasily Grossman with the Red Army'', Pimlico, 2006, ISBN 978-1845950156.
* Bergstrom, Christer. (2007). ''Bagration to Berlin: The Final Air Battles in the East: 1944–1945'', Ian Allen. ISBN 978-1-903223-91-8.
*Buchner, Alex, ''Ostfront 1944: The German defensive battles on the Russian Front 1944'', Schiffer Military History, West Chester, PA, 1991, (White Russia:Army Group Center) ISBN 0-88740-282-8.
* Dunn, W. ''Soviet Blitzkrieg: The Battle for White Russia, 1944'', Lynne Riener, 2000, ISBN 978-1555878801.
* [[David Glantz|Glantz, D.M.]] ''Beylorussia 1944—The Soviet General Staff Study''.
* [[David Glantz|Glantz, D.M.]] ''Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War'', Frank Cass, London, 1989, ISBN 0-7146-3347-X.
* Glantz, David ''The Battle for L'vov, July 1944''. Routledge Press. 2002. ISBN 978-0714652016
* Hastings, Max, ''Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944–1945'', Macmillan, 2004, ISBN 0-333-90836-8.
* Hinze, R. ''Ostfrontdrama 1944: Rückzugskämpfe der Heeresgruppe Mitte''.
* Merridale, C. ''Ivan's War: Inside the Red Army, 1939–45'', Faber, 2006, ISBN 978-0571218097.
* Mitcham, S. ''German Defeat in the East, 1944–5'', Stackpole, 2007.
* Niepold, G., translated by Simpkin, R. ''Battle for White Russia: The Destruction of Army Group Centre June 1944'', Brassey's, London, 1987, ISBN 0-08-033606-X.
* Dr Watt, Robert. ''Feeling the Full Force of a Four Point Offensive: Re-Interpreting The Red Army's 1944 Belorussian and L'vov-[[Przemyśl]] Operations''. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. ISSN 1351-8046
* Zaloga, S. ''Bagration 1944: The Destruction of Army Group Centre'', [[Osprey Publishing]], 1996, ISBN 978-1855324787.
* Ziemke, Earl F. ''Battle For Berlin: End Of The Third Reich'', NY: Ballantine Books, London: Macdonald & Co, 1969.
==External links==
* [http://www.historynet.com/wars_conflicts/world_war_2/3421346.html Operation Bagration: Soviet Offensive of 1944]
* [http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/ww2%20europe/ww2%20europe%20pages/ww2%20europe%20map%2030.htm Map] showing the location of different armies and the pockets where the German 4th Army and 9th Army were destroyed
* [http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/u?/p4013coll8,372 Analysis of deep attack operations: Operation Bagration, Belorussia, 22 June - 29 August 1944] Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS
{{World War II}}
[[Category:Battles involving the Soviet Union]]
[[Category:Battles involving Germany]]
[[Category:Operation Bagration]]
[[Category:Conflicts in 1944]]
[[Category:Strategic operations of the Red Army in World War II]]
[[Category:World War II aerial operations and battles of the Eastern Front]]
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