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Unbeknownst to the Americans, the Soviets were preparing to follow up their invasions of [[Sakhalin]] and the [[Kuril Islands]] with an invasion of the weakly defended island of [[Hokkaidō]] by the end of August, which would have put pressure on the Allies to do something sooner than November. On August 15, the Japanese agreed to surrender, rendering the whole question of invasion moot.<ref>Frank, ''Downfall'', p. 322–324: Glantz, David, "Soviet Invasion of Japan".</ref>
 
== Anslåede tab ==
==Estimated casualties==
Fordi de amerikanske militærplanlæggere antog, "at operationer i dette område ikke kun vil imod de tilgængelige organiserede militære styrker i Kejserriget, men også af en fanatisk fjendtlig befolkning",<ref name="sutherland"/> blev store tab anset for at være uundgåelige, men ingen vidste med sikkerhed hvor højt. Adskillige folk udregnede skøn, men de var vidt forskellige i antal, antagelser og formål, der omfattede argumenter for og imod invasionen. Bagefter blev de genbrugt i debatten [[Atombomberne over Hiroshima og Nagasaki#Debat om beslutningen om at bruge bomben|om at atombombe Hiroshima og Nagasaki]].
Because the U.S. military planners assumed "that operations in this area will be opposed not only by the available organized military forces of the Empire, but also by a fanatically hostile population",<ref name="sutherland"/> high casualties were thought to be inevitable, but nobody knew with certainty how high. Several people made estimates, but they varied widely in numbers, assumptions, and purposes, which included advocating for and against the invasion. Afterwards, they were reused in the [[debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki]].
 
Tabsestimaterne var baseret på erfaringerne fra de foregående kampagner, der lærte forskellige lektioner:
Casualty estimates were based on the experience of the preceding campaigns, drawing different lessons:
 
*InI aet letterbrev sentsendt totil Gen.general [[Curtis LeMay]] fromfra Gen.general [[Lauris Norstad]], whenda LeMay assumedovertog commandkommandoen of theaf B-29-styrkerne force on [[Guam]], fortalte Norstad told LeMay, thatat ifhvis anen invasion tookfandt placested, it wouldville costdet thekoste USUSA "halfen ahalv million" deaddøde.<ref>Coffey, ''Iron Eagle''</ref>
*InI aen studyundersøgelse doneforetaget by theaf Joint Chiefs of Staff ini Aprilapril, thevar figurestallene of 7.,45 casualtiestab/1,.000 manmand-daysdage andog 1.,78 fatalitiesdræbte/1,.000 man-daysmanddage wereblevet developedudregnet. ThisDette impliedindebar, thatat aen 90-daydages ''Olympic''-kampagne campaignville would costkoste 456,.000 casualtiesofre, includingherunder 109,.000 deaddøde oreller missingsavnede. IfHvis ''Coronet'' tooktog anotherendnu 90 daysdage, theville combineddem costsamlede wouldpris bevære 1,.200,.000 casualtiestab, withmed 267,.000 fatalitiesdødsfald.<ref>Frank, ''Downfall'', ps. 135–137.</ref>
*En undersøgelse udført af admiral Nimitz' stab i maj, anslog 49.000 amerikanske tab i de første 30 dage, herunder 5.000 til havs.<ref>Frank, ''Downfall'', s. 137.</ref> En undersøgelse udført af general MacArthurs stab i juni anslog 23.000 amerikanske tab i de første 30 dage og 125.000 efter 120 dage.<ref>Frank, ''Downfall'', s. 137–138.</ref> Da der blev sået tvilv om disse tal af general Marshall, forelagde MacArthur et revideret estimat over 105.000, delvist ved at trække sårede mænd, der var i stand til at vende tilbage til fronten.<ref>Frank, ''Downfall'', s. 138.</ref>
*InI aen conferencekonference withmed Presidentpræsident [[Harry Truman|Truman]] on Juneden [[18. juni]], troede Marshall, takingved theat taget [[Battleslaget ofom Luzon]] assom theden bestbedste model for ''Olympic'', thoughtat theamerikanerne Americansville would sufferlide 31,.000 casualtiestab ini thede firstførste 30 daysdage (andog ultimatelyi sidste ende 20% ofaf Japanesede casualtiesjapanske tab, whichsom impliedindebar aet totalsamlet oftab på 70,.000 casualties).<ref>Frank, ''Downfall'', ps. 140–141.</ref> Adm.Admiral Leahy, moreder impressedvar bymere theimponeret Battleaf of[[slaget om Okinawa]], thoughtmente theat Americande forcesamerikanske wouldstyrker sufferville alide en 35% casualty ratetabsrate (implyinghvilket anindebar ultimateet tollultimativt oftab på 268,.000).<ref name="Frank-Downfall-p.142">Frank, ''Downfall'', ps. 142.</ref> Admiral King thoughtmente, thatat casualtiestab ini theden firstførste 30 daysdage, wouldville fallligge betweenmellem tabene fra Luzon andog Okinawa, idvs.e., betweenmellem 31,.000 andog 41,.000.<ref name="Frank-Downfall-p.142"/> OfAf thesedisse estimatesestimaterne, onlyvar det kun Nimitz's, includedder lossesinkluderede oftab theaf forcesstyrker attil seahavs, thoughselvom kamikazes[[kamikaze]]angreb hadhavde inflictedpåført 1.,78 fatalitiesdræbte perpr. kamikazekamikazepilot piloti inslaget the Battle ofom Okinawa,<ref>Frank, ''Downfall'', ps. 182.</ref> andog trooptroppetransporter transportsud offfor Kyūshū wouldville have beenværet muchlangt moremere exposedudsat.
*Et studie udført for [[Amerikanske krigsministre|krigsminister]] [[Henry Stimson]]s stab af [[William Shockley]] anslog, at det at erobre Japan ville koste 1,7 til 4 millioner amerikanske tab, herunder 400.000-800.000 dræbte, og fem til ti millioner japanske dødsfald. Nøgleantagelse var storstilet deltagelse af civile i forsvaret af Japan.<ref name="shockley">Frank, ''Downfall'', s. 340.</ref>
 
Uden for regeringen, gav velinformerede civile også gæt. [[Kyle Palmer]], der var krigskorrespondent for ''[[Los Angeles Times]]'', sagde at en halv til en million amerikanere ville dø ved udgangen af krigen. [[Herbert Hoover]], der i notater forelagt til Truman og Stimson, anslog også 500.000 til 1.000.000 dræbte, og de var ment at være forsigtige skøn, men det vides ikke, om Hoover drøftede disse konkrete tal i hans møder med Truman. Chefen for Hærens Operationer troede de var "alt for høje" under "vores nuværende plan for kampagnen."<ref>Frank, ''Downfall'', s. 122.</ref>
*A study done by Adm. Nimitz's staff in May estimated 49,000 U.S casualties in the first 30 days, including 5,000 at sea.<ref>Frank, ''Downfall'', p. 137.</ref> A study done by General MacArthur's staff in June estimated 23,000 US casualties in the first 30 days and 125,000 after 120 days.<ref>Frank, ''Downfall'', p. 137–138.</ref> When these figures were questioned by General Marshall, MacArthur submitted a revised estimate of 105,000, in part by deducting wounded men able to return to duty.<ref>Frank, ''Downfall'', p. 138.</ref>
 
[[Slaget om Okinawa]] løb op i 72.000 amerikanske tab på 82 dage, hvoraf 12.510 blev dræbt eller savnet (dette er konservativ, fordi det udelukker flere tusinde amerikanske soldater, der døde efter slaget indirekte af deres sår). Hele øen [[Okinawa]] er 1.200 km<sup>2</sup>. Hvis USA's tabsrate under invasionen af Japan kun havde været 5% så høj pr. arealenhed, som den var på Okinawa, ville USA stadig have mistet 297.000 soldater (dræbt eller savnet).
*In a conference with President [[Harry Truman|Truman]] on June 18, Marshall, taking the [[Battle of Luzon]] as the best model for Olympic, thought the Americans would suffer 31,000 casualties in the first 30 days (and ultimately 20% of Japanese casualties, which implied a total of 70,000 casualties).<ref>Frank, ''Downfall'', p. 140–141.</ref> Adm. Leahy, more impressed by the Battle of Okinawa, thought the American forces would suffer a 35% casualty rate (implying an ultimate toll of 268,000).<ref name="Frank-Downfall-p.142">Frank, ''Downfall'', p. 142.</ref> Admiral King thought that casualties in the first 30 days would fall between Luzon and Okinawa, i.e., between 31,000 and 41,000.<ref name="Frank-Downfall-p.142"/> Of these estimates, only Nimitz's included losses of the forces at sea, though kamikazes had inflicted 1.78 fatalities per kamikaze pilot in the Battle of Okinawa,<ref>Frank, ''Downfall'', p. 182.</ref> and troop transports off Kyūshū would have been much more exposed.
 
NearlyNæsten 500,.000 [[Purple Heart]]-medaljer medalsblev werefremstillet manufacturedi inforventning anticipationom ofde thesårede casualtiessom resultingfølge fromaf theinvasionen invasionaf of Japan​​Japan. ToTil thedags presentdato date,har allalle theamerikanske Americanmilitære militarytab casualties of thei 60 yearsår followingefter the endafslutningen ofaf [[World2. War IIverdenskrig]], including theherunder [[Korean WarKoreakrigen|KoreanKorea]]- andog [[Vietnam WarVietnamkrigen]]se, haveikke notoversteget exceededdette that numbertal. InI 2003, therevar wereder stillstadig 120,.000 ofaf thesedisse Purple Heart-medaljer medals in stocklager.<ref name="surplus hearts">Giangreco, Dennis M. & Moore, Kathryn, "[http://hnn.us/articles/1801.html ''Are New Purple Hearts Being Manufactured to Meet the Demand?'']"; ''History News Network'' (December [[1,. december]] [[2003]]),. RetrievedHentet Decemberden [[4,. december]] [[2006]].</ref> ThereDer areer so manymange ini surplus thatoverskud, combatat unitskampenheder ini [[IraqIrak]] andog [[Afghanistan]] areer ablei tostand keepmedbringe Purple Hearts onHeart-handmedajler til fronten for immediateøjeblikkelig awardat togive soldiersudmærkelsen woundedtil onsoldater thesåret i fieldfelten.<ref name="surplus hearts"/>
*A study done for [[United States Secretary of War|Secretary of War]] [[Henry Stimson]]'s staff by [[William Shockley]] estimated that conquering Japan would cost 1.7-4 million American casualties, including 400,000-800,000 fatalities, and five to ten million Japanese fatalities. The key assumption was large-scale participation by civilians in the defense of Japan.<ref name="shockley">Frank, ''Downfall'', p. 340.</ref>
 
Outside the government, well-informed civilians were also making guesses. [[Kyle Palmer]], war correspondent for the ''[[Los Angeles Times]]'', said half a million to a million Americans would die by the end of the war. [[Herbert Hoover]], in a memorandums submitted to Truman and Stimson, also estimated 500,000 to 1,000,000 fatalities, and those were believed to be conservative estimates; but it is not known if Hoover discussed these specific figures in his meetings with Truman. The chief of the Army Operations division thought them "entirely too high" under "our present plan of campaign."<ref>Frank, ''Downfall'', p. 122.</ref>
 
The [[Battle of Okinawa]] ran up 72,000 US casualties in 82 days, of whom 12,510 were killed or missing. (This is conservative, because it excludes several thousand US soldiers who died after the battle indirectly, from their wounds.) The entire island of Okinawa is {{convert|464|sqmi|km2|abbr=on}}. If the US casualty rate during the invasion of Japan had been only 5% as high per unit area as it was at Okinawa, the US would still have lost 297,000 soldiers (killed or missing).
 
Nearly 500,000 [[Purple Heart]] medals were manufactured in anticipation of the casualties resulting from the invasion of Japan. To the present date, all the American military casualties of the 60 years following the end of [[World War II]], including the [[Korean War|Korean]] and [[Vietnam War]]s, have not exceeded that number. In 2003, there were still 120,000 of these Purple Heart medals in stock.<ref name="surplus hearts">Giangreco, Dennis M. & Moore, Kathryn, "[http://hnn.us/articles/1801.html ''Are New Purple Hearts Being Manufactured to Meet the Demand?'']"; ''History News Network'' (December 1, 2003), Retrieved December 4, 2006.</ref> There are so many in surplus that combat units in [[Iraq]] and [[Afghanistan]] are able to keep Purple Hearts on-hand for immediate award to soldiers wounded on the field.<ref name="surplus hearts"/>
 
== Se også ==
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== Eksterne links ==
{{refbegin}}
*Allen, Thomas B., "[http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/mil/html/ml_038500_operationdow.htm {{en sprog}} ''Operation Downfall'']". Houghton Mifflin Reader's Companion to Military History.
*[[K. Jack Bauer|Bauer, K. Jack]], "[http://www.ww2pacific.com/downfall.html {{en sprog}} ''Operation Downfall: Olympic, Coronet]; World War II in the Pacific, The Invasion of Japan''". ww2pacific.com.
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*Pearlman, Michael D., "[http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Pearlman/pearlman.asp {{en sprog}} ''Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb'']"; Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.
*White, H.V., "[http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll8&CISOPTR=649&CISOBOX=1&REC=11 {{en sprog}} ''The Japanese Plans for the Defense of Kyushu'']"; 31. december 1945. (link til PDF)
{{refend}}
 
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